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240 BENSON V. SUPERIOR COURT [57 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 26567. In Ballk. Jan. 22, 1962.] 
RALPH BENSON, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT 
OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; THE 
PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. 
[1] Adoption-Consent.-To make the consent of the husband of 
the child's mother unnecessary for an adoption, the mother 
must show that she is not cohabiting with her husband (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 1962, subd. 5) and must rebut the statutory pre-
sumptions favoring the child's legitimacy. (Civ. Code, §§ 193, 
194; Code Civ. Proe., § 1963, subd. 31.) 
[2] nlegitimacy - Presumption of Legitimacy - RebuttaL-In a 
custody proceeding the wife may present testimony establish-
ing that she has lived apart from her husband for a sufficient 
length of time to rebut the presumption that the husband 
is the child's father. 
[3] Perjury-Solicitation.-A married woman's testimony before 
the grand jury that, in contemplation of a custody proceeding, 
the accused attorney had told her that there were ways of 
getting around the law, that he was the "only lawyer in town 
who knows how to do it," that he would help get a witness 
to establish that her husband could not have been the father 
of the child in question, and that, on being introduced to a 
second woman, the accused arranged with her to go into the 
judge's chambers and say the baby could not be the husband's 
baby, together with the second woman's testimony that this 
was the arrangement made, showed probable cause to believe 
that the attorney solicited false testimony. The testimony 
solicited related to the very purpose of the cu;.tody proceed-
ing, and it was immaterial that the proceeding was not pending 
at the time of the solicitation. 
[4] Criminal Law-Solicitation of Crimes.-Pen. Code, § 653f, re-
lating to solicitation of certain crimes, is designed not only to 
prevent solicitations from resulting in the commission of the 
crimes solicited, but to protect inhabitants of this state from 
being exposed to inducement to commit or join in the com-
mission of the crimes specified. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Adoption of Children, § 20 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Adoption of Children, § 35 et seq. 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Perjury, § 5l. 
[-!] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, §§ 38, 39; Am.Jur., Criminal 
Law, § 66. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Adoption, § 21; [2] lllegitimacy, § 2; 
[3] Perjury, § 28.1; [4-7] Criminal Law, § 47.1. 
-
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[5] Id,-Solicitation of Crimes.-Purposeful solicitation presents 
dangers calling for preventive intervention and is sufficiently 
indicative of a disposition towards criminal activity to call for 
liability. The fortuity that the person solicited does not 
agree to commit the incited erime should not relieve the solic-
itor of liability. 
[6] Id.-Solicitation of Crimes,-To constitute solicitation of a 
crime, the act solicited must be criminal. If the solicitor be-
lieves that the act can be committed, it is immaterial that the 
crime urged is not possible of fulfilment at the time when the 
words are spoken or becomes impossible at a later time. 
[7] Id,-Solicitation of Crimes.-Solicitation to commit a crime 
is itself the evil prohibited by the Legislature, and prosecu-
tion therefor is particularly appropriate for the very case in 
which the erime solicited does not take place, 
PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior 
Court of Los Angeles County from taking further proceedings 
against petitioner under a count of an indictment, Writ 
denied. 
Alan Ross for Petitioner. 
No appearance for Respondent. 
William B. McKcsson, District Attorney, Harry Wood and 
Robert J. Lord, Deputy District Attorneys, for Real Party 
in Interest. 
'fRAYNOR, J.- Petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition to 
restrain the Superior Court of Los Angeles County from 
taking further proceedings against him under a count of an 
indictment charging him with soliciting perjured testimony 
in violation of Penal Code section 653f.-
The Department of Social Welfare had been conducting an 
investigation of adoption practices in Los Angeles County. 
Mrs. Evelyn Scheillgold, an investigator, visited petitioner, an 
attorney, and told him that she was pregnant, that she wished 
to have the child adopted, and that the child's father was 
·Section 653f of the Penal Code provides: "Every person who solicits 
another . .. to commit or join in the commission of ... perjury .. . 
i. punUlhable by imprisonment- in the county jail not longer than one 
year or in the state prison not longer than five years, or by a fine of not 
more than five thousand dollars. Such offense must be proved by the 
testimony of two witnesses, or of one witness and corroborating circnm-
ltances. " 
242 BENSON V. SUPERIOR COURT [57 C.2d 
unknown, since she had been living with her husband and 
another man. [ 1 ] The husband's consent would normally 
be necessary for an adoption, for a legitimate child" cannot be 
adopted without the consent of its parents .... " (Civ. Code, 
§§ 224, 226.) To make the husband's consent unnecessary, the 
wife must show that she is not cohabiting with him (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 1962, subd. 5) and must rebut the statutory presump-
tions favoring the child's legitimacy. (Civ. Code, §§ 193,194; 
Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subd. 31.) [2] In a custody pro-
ceeding the wife may present testimony establishing that she 
has lived apart from her hnsband for a sufficient length of time 
. to rebut the presumptions that the husband is the child's 
father. 
[3] Mrs. Scheingold testified before the grand jury that in 
contemplation of a custody proceeding petitioner said to her: 
" 'There are ways of getting around the law, and I'm the only 
lawyer in town who knows how to do it.' He said, 'I will help 
you get a witness to establish that your husband could not 
have been the father. I know how to get around these Courts.' " 
She testified further: "I said, 'Mr. Benson, my big problem is 
how I am going to get a witness to testify that I have not 
been with my husband for a period of time.' 
"He said, ' You have a girl friend here, haven't you" 
"I said, 'Yes, but I am afraid she may say the wrong things. 
She's pretty nervous.' 
"Mr. Benson said, 'Don't worry. I'll talk to her. She will 
say the right things.' " 
Subsequently, Mrs. Scheingold introduced Miss Terri Pal-
lato, a fellow investigator, to petitioner as a friend. Mrs. 
Scheingold testified that Miss Pallato, "told Mr. Benson that 
she had never seen my husband, that she did not know him, 
that she did not know whether or not this was his baby, but 
she was willing to swear in the affirmative to both of these 
points . ... 
"Mr. Benson assured her that there was nothing to it. He 
said that Terri and I would go into the Judge's chambers 
and he would ask whether or not she knew my husband and 
whether or not this could be his baby, and she would answer 
that this could not be his baby. 
" 
"Mr. Benson said that Terri should say that she knew my 
husband, but that I hll:d been living out here in Los Angeles 
for over 11 months and this could not be his child." 
Miss Pallato testified: "He said, 'All we do is we three, 
Jan.1!)62] BENSON V. SUPERIOR COURT 
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you, her and me, will walk into the Judge's chambers and he 
will ask you those two questions.' 
"Now, he didn't repeat the questions, but he meant, 'Do 
you know Evelyn's husband' and 'Do you know that this is 
not his baby l' 
"And he said, 'All you do is answer yes to both those ques-
tions. ' 
"So I said, 'Well, I'm terribly nervous about it, Mr. Ben-
son.' I said, 'I don't do this every day of my life ... .' 
"He said, 'Look, there's absolutely nothing to it.' " 
There was thus probable cause to believe that petitioner 
solicited false testimony. The testimony solicited related to 
the very purpose of the custody proceeding, and it is immate-
rial that the proceeding was not pending at the time of the 
solicitation. 
Petitioner contends, however, that he could not have com-
mitted the crime of solicitation since the perjury would not 
have occurred because the fact that Mrs. Scheingold was an 
investigator who was not even pregnant would have pre-
eluded a custody proceeding. Petitioner's alleged acts never-
theless fall clearly within Penal Code section 653f. 
[ 4] That section is designed not only to prevent solicita-
tions from resulting in the commission of the crimes solicited, 
but to protect" inhabitants of this state from being exposed 
to inducement to commit or join in the commission of the 
crimes specified .... " (People v. Burt, 45 Ca1.2d 311, 314 
[288 P.2d 503,51 A.L.R.2d 948].) [5] "Purposeful solici-
tation presents dangers calling for preventive intervention 
and is .sufficiently indicative of a disposition towards criminal 
activity to call for liability. Moreover, the fortuity that the 
person solicited does not agree to commit the incited crime 
plainly should not relieve the solicitor of liability ... ." 
(Model Penal Coue, § 5.02, comment [Tent. Draft No. 10, 
1960] 82.) [6] The act solicited must, of course, be crim-
inal. If the solicitor believes that the act can be committed 
"it is immaterial that the crime urged is not possible of 
fulfilment at the time when the words are spoken" or becomes 
impossible at a later time. (Williams, Criminal Law § 136 
p. 468, § 137 It. 468; see People v. Ro,ias, 55 Ca1.2d 252, 258 
[10 Ca1.Rptr. 465, 358 P.2d 921] ; People v. Camodeca, 52 
Ca1.2d 142, 145-147 [338 P .2d 903J; Model Penal Code, 
§ 5.01(1) (a), comment [Trllt. Draft No. 10. 1960] 31.) This 
rule was clparly enunciated as early as 1864 in Commonwealth 
v. Jacobs, 91 Mass. (9 Allen) 274, 275. In that case a statute 
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made criminal the solicitation of another to leave the state 
to offer himself as a draft substitute for the solicitor. The 
court rejected defendant's contelltion that since the person 
solicited, without the solicitor's kllowledge, had been rejected 
as physically unfit by the army before the solicitation, the 
impossibility of completing the act barred a conviction. (See 
People v. Dessus, 12 Porto Rico 330, 341.) [7] Solicitation 
itself is the evil prohibited by the Legislature, and prosecu-
tion therefor is particularly appropriate for the very case in 
which the crime solicited does not take place. 
The alternative writ heretofore issued is discharged, and 
the petition for the peremptory writ is denied. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb; J., Peters, J., White, J., 
and Dooling, J., concurred. 
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[So F. No. 20531. In Bank. Mar. 1, 1962.] 
RUSSELL S. HARRIS, as Exccutor, etc., Plaintiff and Re-
spondent, v. ROLLAND H . HARRIS ct al., Defendants 
and Appellants. 
[1] Husband and Wife-Management of Community Property-
Limitations on Power of Disposition.-Under Civ. Code, § 172, 
declaring that the husband cannot make a gift of the com-
munity personal property without the wife's consent, gifts 
made without the wife's consent are not void, but are void-
able at her instance. 
[2] Id.-Management of Community Property-Actions to Avoid 
Transfers.-If a wife acts during the continuance of the 
community to avoid her husband's gift of community personal 
property without her consent, the whole gift will be avoided. 
If she acts after the community has been dissolved, the gift 
will be avoided to the extent of her half interest in the com-
munity property transferred. 
[3] Id.-Management of Community Pl·operty-Wife's Interest.-
In addition to the wife's rights in community property under 
Civ. Code, § 161a, defining the respective interests of each 
spouse during continuance of the marriage relation as "present, 
existing and equal" under the management and control of the 
husband, a wife has absolute power of testamentary disposition 
over half of such property (Prob. Code, § 201), and Civ. Code, 
§ 172, safeguards these rights by precluding dissipation of her 
estate without her permission. 
[4] Abatement-Death of Party-Survival of Actions.-A cause 
of action for the violation of a property right survives the 
death of the owner of the right. (Civ. Code, § 954.) 
[5] Husband and Wife-Management of Community Property-
Actions to Avoid Transfers.-The present interest of a wife in 
cOlllmunity property and her right to dispose of one-Illllf by 
will being property rights that are invaded by a husband's 
gift without her consent, the right to set aside such gifts 
[1] Power of either spouse, without consent of other, to make 
gift of community property or funds to third party, note, 17 
A.L.R.2d 1118. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Community Property, § 72. 
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Abatement and Revival, § 60; Am.Jur., 
Abatement and Revival, § 80. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Husband and Wife, § 103(5) ; [2,5, 6] 
Husband and Wife, § 108; [3] Husband and Wife, § 99; [4] Abate-
ment, § 42; [7-9] Insane Persons, § 39. 
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survives the wife's death and may be exercised by bel' per-
sona.l representative. 
[6] ld.-Management of Community Property-Actions to Avoid 
Transfers.-An executor of the estate of a deceased incom-
petent whose husband gave defendant certain stock without 
her consent during her incompetency was entitled to recover 
half of the property transferred where consent was not given 
by the guardian. 
[7] Insane Persons - Guardianship - Allowance of Gifts. - Al-
though neither the general guardian nor a court has the power 
to dispose of the ward's property by way of gift, such rigid 
principle has its exception where allowances from the surplus 
income of the estate of an incompetent person are sought as 
donations for charitable and religious purposes and with the 
object of carrying out the presumed wishes of such person. 
[8] ld.-Guardianship--Allowances to Next of Kin.-Allowances 
from the estate of an incompetent person for the support of 
next of kin may be approved on a showing that the incom-
petent would have made them as suggested. (Prob. Code, 
§ 1558.) 
[9] Id.-Gnardianship--Allowance of Gifts.-A guardian of an in-
competent person has no authority to make gifts from the in-
competent's estate without prior court permission. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ala-
meda County. Monroe Friedman, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action by executor of estate to recover community property 
transferred by decedent's deceased husband while decedent 
was an adjudged incompetent. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed. 
Robert A. Kaiser, Jeremiah F. O'Neill, Jr., and John E. 
Nolan for Defendants and Appellants. 
Clarence De Lancey, Raymond C. Gericke and Myron A. 
Martin for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendants appeal from a judgment for 
plaintiff, executor of the estate of Susie Almeda Harris, in 
an action to recover community property transferred by her 
deceased husband without valuable consideration in violation 
of section 172 of the Civil Code. 
Plaintiff is th~ son of Marshall C. Harris and Susie Almeda 
Harris and the father of defendant Rolland H. Harris. Mar-
shall and Susie Harris were married in 1894. In 1945 Susie 
[9] See Cal.Jur.2d, Insane and Incompetent Persons, § 74. 
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Harris made a will leaving all her property to Marshall Harris 
if he was living six months after her death. If he was not 
then living hcr property was to go to plaintiff. In 1948 Susie 
Harris was adjudged an incompetent, and Marshall Harris 
was appointed her guardian. He r elinquished the guardian-
ship and was r eplaced by plaintiff on March 28, 1957. Susie 
Harris died on September 26, 1957. Marshall Harris died on 
December 10, 1957. 
Between 1950 and March 28, 1957, Marshall Harris made 
gifts of community property totalling $29,543.76 to defend-
ants. After March 28, 1957, he gave defendants certain 
stock, to which the trial court assigned no value, and other 
assets valued at $26,665.89. The finding of the trial court that 
Susie Harris was incapable of giving her consent to any of 
these gifts is amply supported by the record. 
Section 172 of the Civil Code provides: " ... [T] he husband 
has the management and control of the community personal 
property, with like absolute power of disposition, other than 
testamentary, as he has of his separate estate; provided, how-
ever, that he cannot make a gift of such community personal 
property, or dispose of the same without a valuable considera-
tion ... without the written consent of the wife." [1] Gifts 
made without the consent of the wife are not void, but are 
voidable at the instance of the wife. (Trimble v. Trimble, 
219 Cal. 340, 344 [26 P.2d 477] ; Spreckels v. Spreckels, 172 
Cal. 775, 784 [158 P. 537].) [2] If the wife acts to avoid 
the gift during the continuance of the community, the 
whole gift will be avoided. (B,·ifton v. Hammell, 4 Cal.2d 
690, 692 [52 P.2d 221] .) If she acts after the community has 
been dissolved, the gift will be avoided to the extent of her 
one-half interest in the community property transferred. 
(Trimble v. Trimble, S1lp-ra, p. 347.) 
Defendant contends that plaintiff cannot maintain this 
action on the ground that the right to avoid gifts made in 
violation of section 172 is a right personal to the wife that 
does not survive her death and cannot be exercised by her 
executor. 
Section 161a of the Civil Code defines the interests of hus-
band and wife in community property: "The respective inter-
ests of the husband and wife in community property during 
continuance of the marriage relation are present, existing and 
equal interests under the management and control of the hus-
band as is provided in sections 172 and 172a of the Civil Code. 
This section shall be construed as defining the respective 
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interests and rights of husband and wife in the community 
property." Section 161a applies to all property involvcd in 
this case, for it was enacted in 1927 and the trial court found 
that the property was all acquired by the community after 
1927. [3] In addition to her rights under section 161a, 
a wife has absolute power of testamentary disposition over 
one-half of such property. (Prob. Code, § 201.) Section 172 
safeguards these rights by precluding dissipation of her 
estate without her permission. Unlike the present case, Estate 
of Blair, 42 Ca1.2d 728, 730-731 [269 P.2d 612], and Estate 
of Bunn, 33 Ca1.2d 897, 900 [206 P .2d 635], on which defend-
ants rely, did not involve the invasion of present and existing 
property rights or the exercise of a statutory remedy for 
such invasion. 
[4] A cause of action for the violation of a property right 
survives the death of the owner of the right. (Civ. Code, 
§ 954.) The present interest of a wife in community property 
and her right to dispose of one-half by will are property 
rights that are invaded by a husband's gift without her 
consent. [5] Thus the right to set aside such gifts survives 
the death of the wife and may be exercised by her personal 
rcprescntative. 
[ 6 ] The record establishes that the gifts made by Marshall 
Harris after March 28, 1957, were made without the consent 
of Susie Harris. The trial court found that she was incapable 
of giving such consent. Nor was it given by plaintiff while he 
was her guardian. It could not be given after her death. 
Therefore it is clear that plaintiff should recover one-half of 
the property transferred after March 28, 1957. 
The gifts made between 1950 and March 28, 1957, present 
a more difficult question. During this period :Marshall Harris 
was his wife's guardian. If he had power as her guardian 
to give the consent required by section 172 and validly gave 
such consent plaintiff cannot set those gifts aside. 
[7] Although" 'neither the general guardian nor a 
court has the power to dispose of the ward's property by 
way of gift' [citation], such rigid principle has its exception 
where allowances from the surplus income of the estate are 
sought as 'donations for charitable and religious purposes' 
and with the object of 'carrying out the presumed wishes of' 
the incompe [te] nt person [citations]." (Guardianship of Hall, 
31 Ca1.2d 157, 168 [187 P.2d 396].) [8] Allowances for 
the support of next of kin may abo Le approved upon a 
showing that the incompetent would have made them as 
:M~r. 1%2] IL\ nms v. HARRIS 
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suggested. (Prob. Codc, § 1558; Guardianship of Hall, supra; 
Gual·a iallship of Hildelson, 18 Ca1.2d 401, 403-406 [115 P.2d 
805] ; In re Guardianship of Brice, 233 Iowa 183, 186-187 
[8 N.W.2d 576] ; In re Johll.son, 111 N.J.Eq. 268, 270 [162 
A. 96] ; Mattc)· of Flagler, 248 N.Y. 415, 418-419 [162 N.E. 
471, 59 A .L.R. 649].) [9] A guardian has no authority, 
however, to make such gifts without prior court permission. 
(Guardianship of Hall, supra.) Defcndants do not claim that 
Marshall Harris secured such permission before, or after, 
making the contested girts. Nor have they presented evidence 
tending to establish that Susie Harris would have approved 
the gifts had she been competent. The pre-March 28, 1957, 
gifts, as well as those made after that date, were therefore 
made without the consent of Susie Harris as required by 
Civil Code section 172. The trial court correctly determined 
that plaintiff should recover one-half of all gifts of community 
property made by Marshall Harris to defendants between 
1950 and his death in 1957. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J ., White, J., and Dooling, J., con-
curred. 
McCOMB, J.- 1 dissent. I would reverse the judgment for 
the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Shoemaker in the opinion 
prepared by him for the District Court of Appeal in Harris 
v. Harris (Cal.App.), 16 Cal.Rptr. 561, which, so far as neces-
sary for my purposes, reads : 
[]. The defendants' first contention on appeal is that the 
plaintiff Russell S. Harris, suing as cxee:utor of the estate 
of Susie Almeda Harris, does not have standing to sue to 
recover one-half of the community property transferred to 
defendants by Marsball C. Harris. We agree with this con-
tention. 
Civil Code, section 172, states (prior to the 1959 amend-
ments), so far as is pertinent: "The husband has the man-
agement and control of the community personal property, 
with like absolute power of disposition, other than testa-
mentary, as he has of his separate estate; provided, however, 
that he cannot make a gift of such community personal prop-
erty, or dispose of the same without a valuable consideration, 
or sell, convey, ?r encumber the furniture, furnishings, or 
-Brackets together, in this manner [], are used to indicate deletions 
from the opinion of the District Court of Appeal. 
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fittings of the home, or the clothing' or wCIli'ing apparel of 
the wife or minor children that is co:nmullity, ,Yithout the 
written consent of the wife." 
A review of the California decisions involving Civil Code, 
section 172, indicates that the husband's transfer of personal 
community property, without valuable consideration or with-
out the wife's consent, immediately vests the property in the 
donee subject to avoidance by the wife upon proof of facts 
necessary to that end, (Spreckels v. Spreckels (1916) 172 
Cal. 775, 784 [158 P. 537] ; Trimble v, Trimble (1933) 219 
Cal. 340, 344 [26 P.2d 477] ; May?' v. Arana (1955) 133 Cal. 
App,2d 471, 477 [284 P,2d 21],) The wife can set aside the 
transfer of the personal property by the husband, which is 
without valuable consideration or her consent, in its entirety 
during the lifetime of her husband. (Britton v. Hammell 
(1935) 4 Cal.2d 690 [52 P,2d 221] ,) After his death, the 
widow may set aside one-half of the unauthorized transfers 
(Trimble v. Trimble, supra), or recover one-half of the yalue 
from her husband's estate, (Fields v. Michael (1949) 91 Cal. 
App.2d 443, 448 [205 P,2d 402] ,) 
,7i[e are of the opinion that the right to so avoid a transfer 
of community personal property made by the husband in 
violation of the statute is, however, personal to the wife, in-
tended solely for her benefit and her protection (Ital'ian 
American Bank v. Canepa (1921) 52 Cal.App. 619, 621 [199 
P . 55] ; Pomper v, Behnke (1929) 97 Cal.App, 628, 638 [276 
P. 122]; Blethen v, Pacific Ml£t. Life Ins, Co , (1926) 198 
Cal. 91, 100 [243 P. 431]; Spreckels v. Spreckels. supra: 
Schindler v, Schindler (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 597, 603 [272 
P .2d 566]), although not so personal that a guardian of an 
incompetent wife during her lifetime would 110t have the right 
to maintain an action on her behalf (Scott v, Austin (1922) 
57 Cal.App, 553 [207 p , 710]) ; the right being purely per-
sonal to the wife, it must follow that if she, or her guardian 
in case of incompetency, fails to act during her lifetime to 
inYalidate a gift of community personal property, the gift 
becomes valid in its entirety. (United States v, Steu'art (1959 ) 
270 F,2d 894, '900 [applying California law] ; MayI' Y. Aralla. 
supra; Italian American Bank v. Canepa, supra.) A personal 
right, which is not assignable, does not survive the death of 
the person entitled to it even if the wife is incompetent and 
the guardian has not acted on her behalf during her life. 
(Estate of Blair (1954) 42 Cal.2d 728, 731, 733 [269 P,2d 
612] .) [] 
" 
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H ansen v. Bear Film Co., Inc. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 154 [168 
P.2d 946], and Pearl v. Pwrl (1918) 177 Cal. 303 [177 
P. 845], cited ill r espondent's reply brief, concern cases 
wherein transfers of property were made to parties to be 
held in trust for the transferor. However, the court in the case 
before us did not find that the defendants held the property 
in trust and the citations are inapplicable. 
Stafford v. lIia1"iilloni (1923) 192 Cal. 724 [221 P. 919], 
and Makeig v. Unit ed Security Bank &- Trust Co. (1931) 
112 Cal.App. 138 [296 P. 673], also cited in respondent's 
reply brief, concern actions for an accounting of community 
property which was in the deceased's possession at death, and 
do not present the same fact situations as found in this case. 
Likewise, Probate Code, section 201, concerning succession of 
community property after death, does not affect the husband's 
management and control during the lifetime of the parties. 
( Trimble v. Trimble, su.pra, at pp. 340, 345, 346.) [] 
Schauer, J ., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied March 28, 
1962. Schauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion that 
the pet ition should be granted. 
